Table 2. Descriptive statistics of the variables analyzed to explore community forest governance.
| |
| |
|
Variable |
Type |
Mean |
Standard deviation |
Minimum |
Maximum |
| |
|
Ratio between invested and MI logging
benefits |
Quant |
.24 |
.31 |
0 |
1 |
|
Overlay with
FMU†¶ |
Ord |
.15 |
.37 |
0 |
1 |
|
Overlay with
SSV†# |
Ord |
.10 |
.31 |
0 |
1 |
|
Disagreement with
industrial† |
Ord |
.55 |
.51 |
0 |
1 |
|
Delimitation between
villages† |
Ord |
.30 |
.47 |
0 |
1 |
|
Disagreement with
ICA-NGO† |
Ord |
.10 |
.31 |
0 |
1 |
|
Corruption of government
officials† |
Ord |
.40 |
.50 |
0 |
1 |
|
Mismanagement† |
Ord |
.69 |
.48 |
0 |
1 |
|
Struggle for control of management decisions
† |
Ord |
.60 |
.50 |
0 |
1 |
|
Technical
deficiencies† |
Ord |
.25 |
.44 |
0 |
1 |
|
Illegal
timber† |
Ord |
.75 |
.44 |
0 |
1 |
|
Demographic
pressure‡ |
Ord |
1.95 |
.69 |
1 |
3 |
|
Logging commercial
potential‡ |
Ord |
1.75 |
.68 |
1 |
3 |
|
Strength of local
institutions‡ |
Ord |
1.30 |
.47 |
1 |
2 |
|
Objectives of resource
management§ |
Cat |
1.94 |
.25 |
1 |
2 |
|
Appropriate
leadership| |
Ord |
1.25 |
.44 |
1 |
2 |
|
Incentives to local
people| |
Ord |
1.30 |
.47 |
1 |
2 |
|
Coherence of
interests| |
Ord |
1.40 |
.50 |
1 |
2 |
|
| |
† yes=1; no=0
‡ 1=low; 2=medium; 3=high
§ 1=commercial logging; 2=conservation
| 1=non; 2=appropriate
¶ Forest Management Unit
# Sale of Standing Volume
Quant.: Quantitative; Ord.: Ordinal; Cat.: Categorical
FMU: Forest Management Units
SSV: Sales of Standing Volume
ICA-NGO: International Cooperation Agency-Non Governmental Organization
|